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Abstract
We analyse the empirical relationships between firm fundamentals and the depen-
dence structure between individual REIT and stock market returns. In contrast to
previous studies, we distinguish between the average systematic risk of REITs and
their asymmetric risk in the sense of a disproportionate likelihood of joint negative
return clusters between REITs and the stock market. We find that REITs with low
systematic risk are typically small, with low short-term momentum, low turnover,
high growth opportunities and strong long-term momentum. Holding systematic
risk constant, the main driving forces of asymmetric risk are leverage and, to some
extent, short-term momentum. Specifically, we find that leverage has an asymmetric
effect on REIT return dependence that outweighs the extent to which it increases
the average sensitivity of REIT equity to market fluctuations, explaining the strong
negative impact of leverage on firm performance especially during crisis periods that
has been documented in recent empirical work.
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1 Introduction
Periods of financial market turmoil typically lead to disproportionate joint declines in
stock returns. 1 Disproportionate joint negative return clusters between REITs and stocks
are inconsistent with the common characterisation of REITs as defensive securities (Chan,
Hendershott, and Sanders, 1990; Glascock and Hughes, 1995; Howe and Shilling, 1990).
The returns of defensive stocks respond less than proportionally to market fluctuations,
implying a CAPM beta of less than one on average. However, asymmetric dependence in
the sense of disproportionate negative return clusters is independent of linear dependence
measured by the CAPM beta, as illustrated in Figure 1. In other words, the CAPM beta
contains little information on how a given security reacts to a significant market downturn.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
As a result, selecting stocks into a portfolio based on a low level of beta alone is insufficient
to construct robust portfolios that are able to weather a downturn. 2 Rather, effective
stock selection requires the accurate identification of securities with low systematic risk
(beta) and, simultaneously, a low likelihood of joint negative return clusters with stocks.
In this study, we explore the fundamental firm-level drivers of systematic risk (beta) as
well as asymmetric dependence independently of each other. Our results provide novel
insights into the relationships between the returns on the stock market and the returns on
REITs with different firm-level and financial characteristics, facilitating the identification
of resilient firms in the construction of portfolios that are more robust to market downturns.
We are not the first to go beyond beta estimates in studying the joint evolution of invest-
ment returns from real estate (securities), REITs and other asset classes. Prior research
has established three stylised facts about the dependence patterns of real estate security
returns with respect to the broader market: (i) Benefits of diversification vary through
time, (ii) they decrease in periods of higher uncertainty, and (iii) they also tend to dissi-
pate during bear markets. However, the literature has produced limited insight into the
fundamental economic drivers of dependence patterns in security returns. We contribute
to the literature by identifying those firm characteristics that are empirically associated
with the strongest ex ante impact on linear dependence and the likelihood of negative
return clusters with the broader stock market.
1 Evidence for this stylised fact is found in various episodes of market turmoil, see, e.g., Ang and Bekaert (2002);
Ang and Chen (2002); Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006); Hong, Tu, and Zhou (2007); Longin and Solnik (2001); Patton
(2004). Similar return behaviour may be observed in real estate securities, as discussed, e.g., in Gordon (2009).
2 Clustering of poor returns occurs frequently in downturns and can significantly affect portfolio performance and
asset prices (Ang and Bekaert, 2002; Ang, Chen, and Xing, 2006; Longin and Solnik, 2001; Patton, 2009).
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We study the firm-level fundamental determinants of linear dependence as measured by
beta, separately and independently of the drivers of asymmetric dependence, using a sim-
ple test statistic based on exceedance correlations (Alcock and Hatherley, 2016; Hong, Tu,
and Zhou, 2007). Our method stands in contrast to previous explorations on asymmet-
ric dependence such as GARCH modelling or Copula functions. GARCH models describe
time- and/or state-varying correlations and are therefore, much like the CAPM beta, un-
able to capture any disproportionate likelihood of negative return clusters independently of
beta (Zhou and Gao, 2012). Copula functions on the other hand are unable to distinguish
between linear dependence and the drivers of disproportionate negative return clusters
(Clayton, 1978; Kimeldorf and Sampson, 1975; Patton, 2006, 2009). As a result, our find-
ings help evaluate and improve upon traditional investment management techniques that
are focused on managing linear dependence only.
In our analysis of firm characteristics and dependence patterns, we pay particular attention
to the role of leverage. Theoretically, the relationship between leverage and equity returns
is unambiguous. However, the empirical evidence on the relationship between real estate
securities returns and leverage is less clear. That is partly because the relationship between
leverage and risk is under-researched. In fact, Giacomini, Ling, and Naranjo (2015) specif-
ically encourage more research on the effect of leverage on the investment performance
of real estate securities from the point of view of equity investors. We contribute to this
question by examining the relationship between leverage and systematic risk as well as a
disproportionate likelihood of negative return clusters with the stock market.
Empirically, we find that linear dependence and an increasing likelihood of return cluster-
ing between REITs and stocks are distinct aspects of joint return patterns. Our results
suggest that both are significantly related to ex ante observable firm characteristics, but
in different ways. Small stocks with low short-term momentum and low turnover are asso-
ciated with low systematic risk. So are stocks with a high market-to-book ratio and strong
long-term momentum. Stocks with strong short-term momentum appear to be at risk of
poor return clusters with stocks, while investment growth promotes clustering of positive
returns with stocks. We find some evidence that leverage increases linear dependence of
REIT returns on stocks in the long run, while our findings strongly suggest that leverage
exacerbates clustering of poor returns, with immediate and persistent effect.
Section 2 summarises the related literature. Section 3 develops our testable hypotheses.
Section 4 discusses the dependence measures. Section 5 describes method and data. Section
6 presents our empirical findings. Section 7 reports robustness tests. Section 8 concludes.
3
2 Related literature
Under modern portfolio theory, the benefits of diversification associated with including
real estate in a mixed-asset portfolio are typically established on the basis of low average
historical correlations (Baum, 2002; Bond, Hwang, Mitchell, and Satchell, 2007; Georgiev,
Gupta, and Kunkel, 2003). However, the need to incorporate more complex dependence
structures into portfolio selection has been recognised as early as Markowitz (1959). Em-
pirical evidence increasingly points towards time-variation in the benefits of diversification
commonly ascribed to real estate. Clayton and MacKinnon (2001) find that the sensitivity
of REIT returns to the returns on stocks, bonds and direct real estate varies through time
and follows a cyclical pattern. Cotter and Stevenson (2006) report that the correlation
between REITs and the stock market fluctuates around a significant positive trend as
market integration increases over time. Case, Yang, and Yildirim (2012) provide evidence
that structural breaks in the REIT history, such as the introduction of REITs into broader
stock market indices, demarcate different correlation regimes.
Time-variation in dependence patterns is partly a function of the prevailing level of volatil-
ity in the market. Chong, Miffre, and Stevenson (2009) present evidence that the pairwise
correlations between REITs and stocks as well as bonds respond positively to higher
volatility in those markets; they find the opposite for the relationships with government
securities and commodities. Liow, Ho, Ibrahim, and Chen (2009) extend this analysis to
pairs of international listed real estate securities markets as well as the relationships with
the corresponding national stock markets. They confirm the positive relationship between
conditional correlations of listed real estate securities and stocks and the prevailing level of
volatility. These findings suggest that not only are benefits of diversification time-variant,
but they also appear to dissipate in periods of higher uncertainty.
The second driver of time-variation in dependence patterns is the strength of the mar-
ket. Early evidence suggests that REITs exhibit lower systematic risk in bear markets,
suggesting that REITs are defensive stocks (Chan, Hendershott, and Sanders, 1990; Glas-
cock, 1991; Glascock and Hughes, 1995; Glascock, Michayluk, and Neuhauser, 2004; Howe
and Shilling, 1990). More recently however, a large number of studies report evidence of
asymmetric dependence. Many authors find that conditional correlations of listed real es-
tate securities with respect to various benchmarks including stocks, pairs of real estate
securities indices, and pairs of listed versus unlisted real estate return indices, in the US
and internationally, increase disproportionately more in response to negative return shocks
than to positive return shocks (Fei, Ding, and Deng, 2010; Hoesli and Reka, 2013; Liow,
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2012; Michayluk, Wilson, and Zurbruegg, 2006; Yang, Zhou, and Leung, 2012). Moreover,
several authors report a disproportionately high likelihood of joint negative return events
between pairs of listed real estate market indices and between listed real estate and stocks
(Dulguerov, 2009; Goorah, 2007; Hoesli and Reka, 2013; Knight, Lizieri, and Satchell, 2005;
Zhou and Gao, 2012), especially following the onset of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in
2007 (Simon and Ng, 2009). These findings suggest that the benefits of diversification com-
monly associated with investments in real estate securities may be reduced substantially
when they are most needed.
In summary, the empirical literature on dependence structures in the returns from listed
real estate securities to date has established three stylised facts. Benefits of diversification
vary through time, they decrease in periods of higher uncertainty and they also tend
to dissipate during bear markets. However, the literature to date has produced limited
insight into the fundamental economic drivers of dependence patterns between real estate
securities (REITs) and stocks. A notable exception is Liow, Zhou, and Ye (2015), who
recognise this gap in the literature and make a significant contribution towards filling it.
They study the drivers of quarterly realised correlations between eight international listed
real estate securities markets over the period 1995 to 2012. They relate the cross-sectional
and time series variation in correlation between markets to a set of market-wide real estate
variables including the return on the direct real estate market pairs, pairwise market size
and volatility differentials, the influence of the existence of REITs, as well as a set of
control variables capturing macroeconomic, stock market, institutional and crisis effects.
Liow, Zhou, and Ye (2015) is the study that is closest to ours. We share the motivating ob-
servation that the fundamental economic drivers of dependence patterns are insufficiently
understood. However, our work differs from theirs in a number of ways. First, instead of ex-
ploring market-wide dependence patterns across pairs of international market indices, we
focus on the individual firm level. Second, instead of examining macroeconomic influences
on dependence patterns between real estate and stock markets, we focus on the influence
of firm fundamentals on the dependence patterns between individual firm returns and
the stock market, after controlling for broad real and monetary macroeconomic factors.
Finally, instead of studying realised correlations, we focus on the drivers of the CAPM
beta, a well-established measure of linear dependence that feeds directly into asset prices,
and a novel measure of asymmetric dependence that allows us to explore the drivers of a
disproportionate likelihood of joint negative return clusters. To our knowledge, our study
is the first to explore the drivers of dependence patterns in the returns from individual
real estate securities in this way.
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3 Hypothesis development
In our analysis, we focus on the role of leverage in driving the systematic risk of REITs
(CAPM beta) and their asymmetric risk of joint negative return clusters with the stock
market. Little is know about the relationship between leverage and the risk in equity
returns. Sun and Yung (2009) find mixed evidence on the relation between leverage and
REIT volatility. Chaudhry, Maheshwari, and Webb (2004) find that leverage drives REIT
idiosyncratic risk but the direction of the effect is sensitive to model specification. Against
this background, we now develop our testable hypothesis for the expected relationships.
Allen, Madura, and Springer (2000) argue that financial leverage magnifies the firm’s
equity returns when the return on broader market is positive. Conversely, their argument
continues that leverage also magnifies negative returns, creating more pronounced losses.
This line of reasoning is consistent with the argument in Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel,
and Welch (2007) that leverage increases the firm’s exposure to variation in the return on
the general market. As a result, we expect that the sensitivity of a REIT’s equity returns
to variation in the return on the general market, as measured by linear dependence or
systematic risk (CAPM beta), is positively related to the level of leverage of the REIT.
Hypothesis 1: Leverage is positively related to linear dependence (CAPM beta).
In order to form an expectation of the relationship between leverage and the likelihood
of disproportionate joint negative returns with the market, consider managerial incentives
for taking risk in a competitive market for investor capital. Diamond and Rajan (2009) de-
scribe an incentive for managers to load up on ‘hidden’ downside risk in the form of tail risk
in order to report the compensation as alpha. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch
(2007) identify strategies whereby leverage is used especially for this purpose. Empirical
evidence suggests that REIT managers also employ leverage to enhance risk-adjusted per-
formance measures (Alcock, Glascock, and Steiner, 2013). Finally, a typical market decline
can quickly precipitate into a severe crash in the presence of levered positions in tail risk
due to the financial accelerator effect. The financial accelerator exacerbates the impli-
cations of a market decline through tightening credit conditions (Bernanke and Gertler,
1989; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1996; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Perez-Quiros
and Timmermann, 2000). In turn, tighter credit conditions disproportionately affect firms
with higher leverage. As a result, we expect that higher leverage increases the firm’s risk
of experiencing significant negative return clusters with the market.
Hypothesis 2: Leverage is positively related to asymmetric dependence.
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4 Measuring dependence
Studying dependence between security returns means describing their joint distribution.
The joint distribution of any two random variables can be approximated by a combina-
tion of a standard bivariate normal distribution, where dependence is fully captured by
linear measures, such as co-variance, or the scaled version, correlation, and a potentially
infinite number of higher-order co-moments, such as co-skewness and co-kurtosis. 3 This
perspective on dependence patterns is useful as it allows us to conceptually split depen-
dence into a linear component that informs traditional portfolio management strategies,
and the higher-order components that receive increasing academic and investor interest.
The existing literature typically relies on multivariate GARCH models or copula functions.
Multivariate GARCH models focus on describing correlations. However, we seek to iden-
tify determinants of dependence in a way that is economically meaningful to downside-risk
averse investors. Any metric that focuses on a single order of dependence, such as correla-
tion or any related partial moment, will not explore higher-order aspects of dependence.
Yet, these are among the major drivers of joint value declines during bear markets (Ang
and Chen, 2002; Longin and Solnik, 1995, 2001). 4 Copula functions on the other hand
provide a more comprehensive view on dependence. However, copulas commonly rely on a
small number of parameters that simultaneously determine the location, slope and shape
of the joint distribution (Clayton, 1978; Kimeldorf and Sampson, 1975; Patton, 2006,
2009). The resulting description may thus be a poor approximation of the true distribu-
tion. Further, the parameters of the copula do not map to the individual moments of the
joint distribution, and so copulas are unable to distinguish between correlations and any
higher-order aspects of dependence. Any copula-based analysis is therefore of limited use
in evaluating and improving upon traditional correlation-based diversification strategies.
In order to mitigate the shortcomings of these methods, we study a set of two complemen-
tary measures of dependence. First, we examine linear dependence as measured by the
CAPM beta, which has established intuitive meaning and is firmly grounded in financial
theory. Second, we employ a recently developed measure of asymmetric dependence, the
‘Adjusted J statistic’. This measure, along with its economic and statistical motivation, is
described in detail in Alcock and Hatherley (2016). In combination, these two measures
provide a comprehensive assessment of dependence patterns between security returns. 5
3 This decomposition is commonly referred to as the Edgeworth series expansion. For details, see Hall (1992).
4 Zhou and Gao (2012) provide a lucid discussion of the shortcomings of correlation as a measure of dependence.
5 We could also consider test statistics for structural breaks in dependence patterns. However, tracing test statistics
for structural breaks in existing dependence measures does not allow us provide a continuous measure of dependence
patterns that can easily be estimated as a function of firm characteristics.
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The adjusted J statistic is designed to capture asymmetric dependence, which is the dif-
ference between the dependence of returns on an individual asset and the market across
different market states. This metric is derived in the context of Skiadas’s (1997a; 1997b)
economic framework of disappointment aversion. The Adjusted J statistic is closely re-
lated to the J statistic developed by Hong, Tu, and Zhou (2007), which is based on the
exceedance correlations between the returns on two assets or portfolios. Longin and Solnik
(2001) define the exceedance correlation at level ϑ as the conditional correlation between
two variables when both register shocks of more than ϑ standard deviations from their
means. Under the null hypothesis of no asymmetric dependence, i.e. no significant differ-
ences in the exceedance correlations in opposing regions of the joint distribution, the J
statistic is given by:
Jρ := T (ρˆ
+ − ρˆ−)′Ωˆ−1(ρˆ+ − ρˆ−) ∼ χ2N , (1)
where ρˆ are the exceedance correlations, T is the sample size, Ωˆ is the variance/covariance
matrix and N is the number of exceedances. The greater the test statistic, the greater
the departure from symmetry. However, the J statistic does not account for linear depen-
dence and it is unable to indicate the direction of asymmetry. In order to mitigate these
shortcomings, Alcock and Hatherley (2016) define the Adjusted J statistic as follows:
JAdj :=
[
sgn
([
ρˆ+ − ρˆ−]1)]T (ρˆ+ − ρˆ−)′Ωˆ−1(ρˆ+ − ρˆ−) (2)
The addition of the sign function (Alcock and Hatherley, 2009) means that the statistic
indicates the sign of the sum of the differences between positive and negative conditional
correlations and hence indicates the direction of asymmetry. A positive (negative) test
statistic indicates net upper (lower) tail dependence. This feature is useful as investors
are arguably particularly concerned about lower tail dependence, that is, increasing con-
ditional correlations and thus dissipating benefits of diversification during bear markets.
Further, the arguments in the Adjusted J statistic are not the raw or standardised return
series but a transformation that controls for the level of linear dependence. 6 After the
transformation, all asset returns display identical betas of unity while the original linear
6 The linear component of dependence in any bivariate distribution is captured by the OLS slope coefficient esti-
mator, (XTX)−1XTY . The adjusted J statistic thus controls for linear dependence by filtering with this estimator.
By doing so, the adjusted J statistic controls for the first moment and first co-moment within the Edgeworth ex-
pansion of joint returns, ensuring that the adjusted J captures economically relevant and theoretically motivated
information about asymmetric dependence in a statistically rigorous manner. The estimator for the CAPM beta
“just happens” to be the same estimator as the OLS beta estimator, and so by filtering through the linear control we
are also filtering through the CAPM beta. Filtering through a set of firm-characteristic of macro factors in addition
to the CAPM beta might provide additional insights into the role played by these factors and their relationships
with asymmetric dependence and thus shed additional light on any return premium generated by these factors. An
analysis of this question however requires a structural alteration of the Adjusted J statistic and is therefore beyond
the scope of this study. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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dependence structure between the asset and the benchmark is controlled for. This feature
is useful to evaluate and improve upon diversification strategies that traditionally focus
only on linear dependence as measured by beta. In summary, the Adjusted J statistic
assesses the presence, direction and strength of asymmetric dependence after controlling
for linear dependence as measured by the CAPM beta. As a result, the combination of
the CAPM beta and the Adjusted J statistic allows us to comprehensively examine linear
and higher-order components of dependence patterns separately in a robust manner.
5 Method and data
5.1 Empirical approach
We obtain the dependence measures as follows. We run quarterly firm-level regressions of
daily total returns on a stock market benchmark to obtain the single-index (CAPM) beta:
TRit = β0 + β1Benchmarkt + uit (3)
where TR is the total return on firm i at day t, Benchmark is the total return on the
benchmark stock index at time t, β0 is a constant, β1 is the regression coefficient we
collect from each quarterly regression to generate our first dependent variable, and u is
the residual. These quarterly regressions allow us to compile a firm-quarter panel of CAPM
beta estimates. In order to obtain a robust estimate of the single-factor beta, we require
firms to have more than 50 observations available in a given quarter.
The Adjusted J statistic is also obtained from daily returns. Recall that the statistic
measures exceedance correlations between a firm and the stock market in a given quarter,
conditional on the firm and the market experiencing returns ϑ standard deviations away
from their means in that quarter, where ϑ is a vector of exceedances. We calculate the
Adjusted J statistic with exceedances ϑ = {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1} in conjunction with the
Bartlett kernel for the estimation of the variance-covariance matrix, Ωˆ, following Hong, Tu,
and Zhou (2007). That means that exceedances are not exogenously defined as a function
of economic upturns and downturns, only relative to the quarterly means of daily returns.
Further note that the statistic measures the net difference between corresponding ex-
ceedance correlations in opposing tails of the joint distribution. If these net differences are
zero, then the joint distribution is symmetrical. If they are different from zero, then the
joint distribution is characterised by asymmetric dependence. As a result, the power of the
Adjusted J statistic to capture asymmetric dependence is not per se dependent on extreme
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return realisations as would be observed in upturns and downturns only. The ability of the
Adjusted J statistic to detect asymmetric dependence is solely contingent on exceedance
correlations in the two opposing tails of the distribution being different from one another.
Lastly, in order to increase the accuracy of the calculation of the Adjusted J statistic, we
compute it using one year’s worth of daily returns, not one quarter. We thus compile a
firm-quarter panel of rolling annual Adjusted J statistics. 7
We estimate the dependence measures as a function of our chosen set of firm characteristics
and macroeconomic control variables, allowing us to assess the marginal impact of a change
in any of the firm characteristics on the dependence measures, all else being equal. We
estimate the following model using OLS:
DMit = γ0 + γ1MLEVi,t−1 + γ2MBi,t−1 + γ3LnSizei,t−1 + γ4RET6i,t−1 (4)
+ γ5RET36i,t−1 + γ7TOi,t−1 + γ8REINVi,t−1 + γ9ROAEi,t−1
+ γ10FedFundst−1 + γ11Rect + γ12DMit−1 + uit
where DM is the dependence measure, γ0 is a constant and uit is the residual. Following
the asset pricing literature, we include the following explanatory variables. Market leverage
MLEV (Bhandari, 1988) is measured as Total Debt divided by the Market Value of Assets
(Total Assets minus Book Equity + Market value of Equity). Firm size LnSize (Banz,
1981; Keim, 1983) is the natural logarithm of the Market Capitalisation. Market-to-book
ratio MB (Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein, 1985; Stattman, 1980) is the Market Value of
Assets divided by the book value of Total Assets. 6-month (36-month) return (RET6 and
RET36) (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) is the 6-month (36-
month) cumulative total return. In addition, we control for stock turnover as a measure
of liquidity (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Holmstro¨m and Tirole, 2001; Liu, 2006). The
turnover ratio TO is quarterly Trading Volume divided by Common Shares Outstand-
ing. Following the investment-based approach to asset pricing in real estate (Bond and
Xue, 2014), we also control for real estate investment growth (REINV ) and profitability,
measured as return on average equity (ROAE). In order to control for macroeconomic
conditions, we include the federal funds rate (FedFunds) and the NBER business cycle
indicator as a binary variable that equals one in a recession period (Rec). 8
7 The downside of this approach is that we introduce autocorrelation, potentially over four quarters, in the Adjusted
J statistic. However, this is easily remedied by including up to four lags of the Adjusted J statistic in the regression
model. Our results are robust to controlling for these additional lags and are available on request.
8 All of our findings are qualitatively equivalent when replacing the policy-determined federal funds rate with a
market-determined benchmark bond yield. Results are available on request.
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All explanatory variables, except the recession indicator, are lagged by one period. The lag
ensures that firm characteristics are observable by market participants prior to the period
over which the dependence measure is generated. Consequently, our inference relates to
the predictive content of the firm characteristics for the dependence patterns in security
returns. The lag also mitigates a potential simultaneous causality bias whereby managers
change firm characteristics, for instance by adjusting leverage, in response to observing a
given dependence pattern. In order to account for autocorrelation in dependence measures,
we include their first lags. We also include property type and quarter fixed effects.
By construction, the dependent variables in (4) are subject to estimation error. Utilising
the estimates as the dependent variable in a second-stage regression results in an estimated
dependent variable bias. In order to mitigate this bias and enable valid inference, we
follow the procedure proposed in Hornstein and Greene (2012) and weight all independent
observations by the inverse of the variance of the dependent variable.
The frequency of financial time series observations raises the question of non-synchronous
trading and its consequences on the accurate estimation of covariance and related mea-
sures of dependence. The phenomenon has been documented as early as Fisher (1966) who
demonstrates that when the arrival of trades is random and therefore non-synchronous
across assets, then return observations sampled at regular intervals are correlated with
neighbouring returns on other assets even when the underlying relationship is purely con-
temporaneous, leading to a systematic under-estimation of covariance. However, Epps
(1979) shows that the bias is severe only beyond the inter-hour level. Considering our
daily frequency, we believe that our measurement of covariance is sufficiently accurate.
5.2 Data set
We analyse a sample of publicly listed US equity REITs. We collect total return data,
firm characteristics and returns on the S&P500 from SNL Financial. 9 Apart from firm
characteristics, dependence patterns may also be influenced by macroeconomic regimes
(Liow, Zhou, and Ye, 2015). We account for macroeconomic conditions using interest rate
data and recession indicators. Data on the federal funds rate and the 10-year Treasury is
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis’s Economic Database. Information
on the dates that demarcate macroeconomic regimes are obtained from the NBER.
We begin our analysis in 1993, the beginning of the modern REIT era as marked by the
9 For robustness, we employ the Russell 2000 small-cap index as an alternative benchmark. Our results remain
unchanged and are available upon request.
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introduction of the UPREIT regime. We end the study period in 2013, the most recent full
year of data available at the time of writing. Firms enter the sample when they first appear
on SNL and leave the sample when they become inactive (acquired or defunct). Firm
characteristic data is obtained on a quarterly frequency. Return data for the calculation of
the dependence measures is collected on a daily frequency to reduce measurement errors
and smoothing of dependence measures. All firm characteristic variables, except the stock
returns used to compute the dependence measures, are winsorised at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. The final number of firm-quarters is 3,828 from an average of 55 firms per
quarter. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the number of sample firms over time.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
Table 1 summarises the firm characteristics of the sample REITs. The mean single-factor
beta is 0.589 for the S&P500, consistent with the view the REITs are on average defensive
stocks (Chan, Hendershott, and Sanders, 1990; Glascock and Hughes, 1995; Howe and
Shilling, 1990) and thus implying that REITs offer some benefits of diversification (Baum,
2002; Bond, Hwang, Mitchell, and Satchell, 2007; Georgiev, Gupta, and Kunkel, 2003).
The Adjusted J statistic is -0.184 on average, suggesting a slight tendency for REIT returns
to cluster disproportionately with poor returns on the stock market.
As for the fundamental firm characteristics, market leverage is on average 0.44, consistent
with the observation that REITs carry significant leverage (Barclay, Heitzman, and Smith,
2013). The mean market-to-book ratio is 1.204 and the mean log of firm size is 12.844,
consistent with the view that REITs are small value stocks (Geltner and Miller, 2001).
The 6-month (36-month) cumulative total return averages 0.071 (0.488) over the sample
period. On average, a proportion of 0.295 of common REIT shares outstanding is traded
each quarter. Investment growth averages 0.185 and profitability averages 0.072, both
broadly consistent with Bond and Xue (2014) who study the role of investment-related
factors on asset prices. The federal funds rate averages 0.032 over the study period and a
proportion of 0.105 of observations fall into recessionary periods as defined by the NBER.
The final column shows the inverse normal z-statistic from a Fisher-type (Augmented
Dickey-Fuller) test for unit roots in unbalanced panel data proposed in Choi (2001). The
null hypothesis is that all panels (firms) have a unit root in the variable concerned. We
reject the null hypothesis for all of the dependence measures and all but one of the firm
characteristics we are interested in (firm size). We conclude that concerns around non-
stationarity of the variables in our study are negligible.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
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Figure 3 Panel (a) shows the evolution of quarterly mean firm-level single-factor beta
estimates with respect to the S&P500 over time. From approximately 1995 onwards, the
average REIT beta increases at a slow but steady pace over time, consistent with the
view of increasing market integration that has been observed for international real estate
and stock market indices (Liow, Zhou, and Ye, 2015). The measure then increases sharply
surrounding the global financial crisis of 2007/08, consistent with the anecdotal observation
that in a crisis, correlations approach one (Gordon, 2009). Single-factor beta estimates were
also significantly more volatile during the crisis than during the remainder of the study
period. Further, the 95% confidence interval around the mean estimate is larger at the
beginning of the sample period from 1993 to 1995, then reduces to around 25 basis points
until 2004, after which it widens. Confidence intervals are wider especially during the
crisis and reduce gradually thereafter, consistent with our expectation of cross-sectional
variation in the sensitivity to stock market returns and thus benefits of diversification.
Figure 3 Panel (b) shows the evolution of quarterly mean firm-level Adjusted J statistic
estimates with respect to the S&P500. For most of the study period from 1993 to ap-
proximately 2005, the mean Adjusted J statistic oscillates with a cyclical pattern between
zero and -1, suggesting no to slight levels of clustering of negative returns. Between 2005
and 2006, the peak of the boom prior to the global financial crisis of 2007/08, the average
Adjusted J statistic becomes increasingly positive reaching a peak of approximately 1.5,
suggesting disproportionate clustering of positive returns during this significant expansion
phase for REITs. The measure then drops sharply. After the end of the global financial
crisis of 2007/08, the mean Adjusted J statistic resumes its pre-crisis levels and cyclical
pattern. Consistent with beta, the 95% confidence interval around the mean estimate is
larger at the beginning of the sample period and then reduces slightly over time. However,
confidence intervals around the mean Adjusted J statistic are consistently wider than for
the CAPM beta, suggesting cross-sectional variation no only in average linear dependence
but even more so in the disproportionate tendency to register joint negative returns with
the stock market.
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 4 traces the evolution of the mean CAPM beta and Adjusted J statistic measures
relative to NBER recession dates. The downturn in 2001 was not associated with any
visible variation in the dependence measures marking the beginning or the end of this
episode. However, in the recession 2007-2009, we notice two trends. First, the CAPM beta
increases significantly from Q1 2008 onwards until it peaks in Q1 2009 and subsequently
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returns to pre-crisis levels. Second, the Adjusted J statistic declines substantially from
approximately 2006 onwards and hits a trough at the beginning of the crisis at the end of
2007. It then undergoes some fluctuation during the crisis period and eventually returns
to pre-crisis levels. That means that the Adjusted J statistic dropped markedly a number
of quarters before the official onset of the global financial crisis of 2007/08 of 2007-2009
that saw severe joint losses across asset classes including stocks and real estate securities
(Gordon, 2009). This observation suggests that the measure has predictive power for future
REIT performance that managers, investors and policy makers may monitor.
[Insert Figure 4 about here.]
6 Results
6.1 Unconditional analysis
Table 2 describes the relationships between firm characteristics and dependence measures
using simple pairwise correlations. We find that, on an unconditional basis, the single-factor
beta (S&P500) is slightly positively related to the Adjusted J statistic. The Adjusted J
statistic is calculated based on filtered returns in order to avoid confounding the mea-
surement of asymmetric dependence with linear dependence. Any remaining correlation
between the two measures thus suggests that there are genuinely common drivers.
Overall, the top three covariates of both dependence measures are the interest rate,
turnover, firm size. In relative terms, we find that linear dependence, as measured by
the single-factor CAPM beta, is related to macroeconomic factors and firm characteristics
to a similar degree. Asymmetric dependence is more strongly related to firm characteris-
tics, especially size, while the relationship with macroeconomic factors is relatively weaker.
In conclusion, we find that firm characteristics matter for linear dependence and are also
related to an increasing likelihood of joint negative returns between REITs and stocks.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
Next, we carry out an unconditional multivariate quintile analysis. Every quarter, we sort
firms into quintiles according to their beta estimate and, separately, according to their Ad-
justed J statistic, both relative to the S&P500 index. Quintile 1 contains the firm-quarters
with the lowest values of the dependence measure. Quintile 5 contains the firm quarters
with the highest values for the dependence measures. We tabulate the corresponding mean
firm characteristics in each quintile and then test the hypothesis that these means differ
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significantly across the top and bottom quintiles. This analysis allows us to identify the
set of characteristics that firms with low systematic risk and, respectively, a low tendency
for negative return clusters with the stock market, have in common.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
For the analysis of the CAPM beta in Panel (a) of Table 3, the most defensive stocks
are in quintile 1 (lowest beta measure). The most defensive stocks have a number of
characteristics in common. They are simultaneously small, high-growth (high book-to-
market ratio) firms that are less intensively traded. In contrast to the pairwise correlation
analysis, we find no evidence that the difference in leverage is part of the characteristics
that significantly distinguish low-beta from high-beta stocks.
In Panel (b) of Table 3, the stocks with the highest likelihood of joint negative return
clusters with stocks are in quintile 1 (lowest Adjusted J statistic). The stocks with the
highest tendency to display lower tail dependence with the stock market also have number
of characteristics in common. They are on average small and thinly traded. This uncon-
ditional observation suggests a trade-off between linear dependence and the likelihood of
disproportionate joint negative return clusters. While small size and thin trading activ-
ity appear to be associated with low linear dependence, they simultaneously exacerbate
asymmetric joint declines with the stock market. The second difference to the analysis of
the CAPM beta is the role of leverage. In this multivariate setting, we find that leverage is
significantly associated with a higher likelihood of joint negative return clusters. In other
words, we find that leverage is not one of the characteristics that significantly distinguishes
defensive stocks that exhibit a low degree of dependence on the stock market on average.
However, our findings do suggest that the level of indebtedness of a firm significantly ex-
acerbates the likelihood of disproportionate joint negative returns. As a result, our finding
suggests that leverage has an asymmetric impact on performance.
6.2 Firm characteristics and average systematic risk
Table 4 presents the regression results for the CAPM beta with respect to the S&P500.
Our model explains 71% of the total variation in firm-level beta estimates in the full sample
of 3,828 observations over the study period 1993-2013. The estimation for the recession
period contains significantly fewer observations than the non-recession period (401 versus
3,427). However, the explanatory power of our model is higher in the recession period
(0.87) than in the non-recession period (0.67).
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[Insert Table 4 about here.]
We do not find evidence for a relationship between leverage and systematic risk in our
one-period ahead regressions. This finding stands in contrast to our first hypothesis. In
theory, leverage increases the sensitivity of the return on equity to variation in the return
(Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch, 2007). Empirically, we find a positive sign of
the coefficient on leverage, which is intuitive, but the value of the coefficient is not statis-
tically significant. However, the impact of leverage does pass the threshold for statistical
significance in the longer run: When we consider the two-period (6 months) ahead measure
of beta, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that leverage increases average
systematic firm risk (see Column (1) in Appendix A.1). Our finding is thus also consistent
with the earlier work of Allen, Madura, and Springer (2000).
As for the remaining firm characteristics, we find a number of additional significant re-
lationships. First, we find that beta is positively related to firm size. Our finding seems
intuitive. Larger firms have a larger share of the market return and are thus more sensi-
tive to market variation. This finding is robust across the different sub-periods and the
coefficient is stable with an economic impact of approximately 7 basis points on beta for
a one standard deviation increase in logged firm size.
We also find that beta is inversely related to the market-to-book ratio. This finding suggests
that firms with stronger growth opportunities are less sensitive to variation in the market
return, implying that these growth opportunities are largely idiosyncratic and thus shift the
total risk of the firm away from exposure to variation in the market. Further, the effect of
growth opportunities on beta is numerically almost three times larger in the recessionary
sub-period, suggesting that idiosyncratic growth opportunities were especially valuable
during this period of general market turmoil. The economic impact of a one standard
deviation drop in the market-to-book ratio is an increase in beta by 2 basis points in the
full study period, and 5 basis points in the recession period.
Our evidence for the relationship between momentum and beta is mixed. 6-month returns
are positively related to beta in the full and non-recessionary periods, while 36-month
returns are inversely related to beta in these periods. The reversal in the effects of short-
and long-term momentum suggests that long-term cumulative returns reflect performance
that is unrelated to the performance of the underlying market, but driven by idiosyncratic
factors. Short-term performance may be more driven by short-term trading activity, in-
creasing systematic risk. These effects disappear in the recession periods, suggesting that
their influence on systematic risk is more relevant in benign market environments. In the
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full period, the economic impact of a one standard deviation increase in short-term momen-
tum, or an equivalent reduction in long-term momentum, is an increase of approximately
1 basis point in the single-index beta coefficients, respectively. Our finding is consistent
with the literature on momentum and momentum-reversal (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985).
Our results suggest that the turnover ratio, i.e. the proportion of shares outstanding that
is traded in a quarter, is positively related to beta. As a stock is traded more frequently,
the sensitivity of its performance to the return on the mark increases. Frequent trading
may be a signal of investors seeking short-term gains by following momentum, rather than
investing for the long run on the basis of the fundamentals of the firm, thus linking the
findings on momentum and trading volume. On average, the economic impact of a one
standard deviation increase in turnover is an 8 basis points increase in systematic risk.
We find that beta estimates are significantly related to macroeconomic factors. 10 This
finding echoes our earlier observation that there is a significant negative unconditional
correlation between interest rates and the systematic risk of REITs, and that systematic
risk increased in recession periods. However, our findings also suggest that while macroeco-
nomic factors may provide some guidance on the systematic risk of REITs, they are unable
to supersede fundamental firm characteristic factors. In other words, our findings suggest
that while the systematic risk of all REITs to some extent is influenced by macroeconomic
conditions, REITs with the appropriate fundamental characteristics, such as smaller size
and higher (idiosyncratic) growth opportunities are able to withstand these conditions
better and maintain lower systematic risk in a recession than others.
We find a significant relationship between past values of beta and present values of beta,
as the lag of beta is positive and significant in our regression results. However, while the
recent history of systematic risk is a significant indicator of the present level of systematic
risk, it does not replace or subsume the effect of fundamental and macroeconomic factors.
In summary, our results suggest that investors are able to form expectations about the
average sensitivity of a firm’s equity to variation in the return on the market, and thus the
benefits of including a given stock in a portfolio, by assessing the firm’s size and growth
opportunities, its past performance and the intensity with which it is traded. Even in
recession periods, the firm fundamentals size, market-to-book ratio and trading intensity
maintain significant predictive power for firm-level systematic risk.
10 Our findings are consistent across the policy rate (federal funds rate) and the market-determined interest rate
(10-year Treasury rate).
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6.3 Firm characteristics and negative return clusters
Table 5 presents the regression results for the Adjusted J statistic with respect to the
S&P500. Our model explains 58% of the total variation in firm-level Adjusted J statistic
estimates in the full sample.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
Consistent with our second hypothesis, we find that leverage is inversely related to Ad-
justed J statistic. A lower statistic implies a higher likelihood of negative return clusters
with the market, suggesting that leverage disproportionately exacerbates the risk of a joint
decline in the returns on REITs and the stock market. Over the full period, the economic
impact of a one standard deviation increase in leverage is a 2 basis points drop in the
Adjusted J statistic, i.e. a 10% decline relative to the sample mean of the Adjusted J
statistic. In the recessionary period, the economic impact increases to a 10 basis points
drop in the Adjusted J statistic for a one standard deviation increase in leverage. In com-
bination with our analysis of the CAPM beta, our results suggest that, while leverage
may not substantially increase the one-period ahead estimate of systematic risk of REITs
on average, it has a statistically and economically significant impact on the risk of joint
negative return clusters between REITs and the stock market.
Understanding the link between leverage and systematic risk as well as asymmetry risk is
useful for identifying the mechanism through which leverage affects equity returns. In the-
ory, the relationship between leverage and equity returns is clear. According to the second
proposition of the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), leverage increases
the risk to equity holders as residual claimants and thus higher leverage is associated with
higher rates of required return on equity.
However, the empirical evidence on the relationship between leverage and equity returns is
less clear. Over the period 1994-2003, Cheng and Roulac (2007) document a weak inverse
relationship between REIT returns and leverage. Sun, Titman, and Twite (2015) focus
on the global financial crisis of 2007/08 and present evidence that more highly levered
REITs suffered larger declines in that period than their less indebted counterparts. In an
international sample of listed real estate investment firms, Pavlov, Steiner, and Wachter
(2015) find that leverage is unrelated to stock returns. Ling and Naranjo (2015) document
significant time-variation in the relationship between leverage and REIT returns as well
as volatility, with more highly levered REITs experiencing more pronounced variation in
stock returns through the market cycle. Giacomini, Ling, and Naranjo (2015) on the other
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hand find a positive relationship between international real estate securities returns and
leverage. Their evidence also suggests that the relationship between returns and leverage
was negative during the global financial crisis of 2007/08.
The studies mentioned above do not address the way in which leverage affects risk, and
are thus unable to document the mechanism through which leverage affects the return on
equity that investors receive as compensation for the risk they assume. Our results suggest
that leverage affects equity returns primarily through the increased risk of joint negative
return clusters with the market, and to some extent also through higher systematic risk
as measured by the CAPM beta. Our finding may help explain some of the inconclusive
evidence on the impact of leverage on performance by highlighting the asymmetric nature
of its effect on dependence patterns in REIT returns.
Recall that the economic magnitude of the effect of leverage also increases substantially
during the recessionary sub-period. As a result, our finding further adds to the empirical
evidence on the short-term and long-term detrimental effects of leverage on REIT perfor-
mance during and after the financial crisis of 2008 that is documented in Sun, Titman,
and Twite (2015) and in Giacomini, Ling, and Naranjo (2015).
Leverage may influence returns through a tax shield effect, an effect on the cost of equity
capital directly, or an indirect effect via the cost of debt capital. For tax-exempt REITs
the tax effect is nearly irrelevant. The debt capacity of real estate assets (Cvijanovic´,
2014; Giambona, Golec, and Schwienbacher, 2014) allows REITs to pledge collateral when
sourcing debt. The use of collateral is often associated with better credit outcomes 11 ,
suggesting the REIT cost of debt has a relatively lower sensitivitiy to leverage. This leaves
the cost of equity channel. The literature suggests that leverage indeed influences REIT
stock returns, and thus the cost of equity. However, Giacomini, Ling, and Naranjo (2015)
note that the evidence on the average strength and direction of the effect is unclear. Our
work suggests that a focus on the effect of leverage on asymmetry risk helps identify a
clear inverse relationship between realised REIT returns and leverage.
We find that the Adjusted J statistic is positively related to firm size, suggesting a trade-
off between average systematic risk and the risk of disproportionate joint return clusters
in this respect. We find that larger firms carry higher systematic risk but that they are
less likely to exhibit joint negative return clusters with stocks, suggesting that they hold
portfolios which are more robust to downturns. This finding implies that stock selection
11 See, for example, Besanko and Thakor (1987a,b); Bester (1985); Boot and Thakor (1994); Chan and Kanatas
(1985); Chan and Thakor (1987)
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according to firm size has to be sensitive to the expected market environment in order to
make an effective contribution to portfolio management. In economic terms, as the log of
firm size increases by one standard deviation, the Adjusted J statistic increases by 5 basis
points, or 20% relative to the mean Adjusted J statistic in the full sample.
The evidence we find for the relationship between past (6-month and 36-month) returns
and the Adjusted J statistic is consistent with the evidence for systematic risk on average
in the full study period. Strong short-term momentum is associated with a drop in the
Adjusted J statistic, i.e. it exacerbates a stock’s tendency to exhibit joint negative return
clusters with the market. On the other hand, strong long-term momentum is associated
with an increase in the Adjusted J statistic, suggesting that it alleviates the risk of joint
negative return clusters with the stock market.
We find that the estimates of the Adjusted J statistic are less strongly related to the
macroeconomic factors. 12 This finding reflects our earlier observation that the pairwise
correlations between firm characteristics and the Adjusted J statistic are relatively stronger
than those with the macroeconomic variables.
In contrast to the analysis of beta, we find a significant relationship between real estate
investment growth and the risk of joint negative return clusters. As investment growth in-
creases, the likelihood of joint negative return clusters is reduced significantly. Our finding
adds to the literature on the relevance of investment-related factors to REIT assets prices
by establishing a link between those factors and asymmetry risks (Bond and Xue, 2014).
We also find evidence that there is a significant relationship between past values of beta
and present values of the Adjusted J statistic, as the lag of beta is positive and significant
in our regression results. However, while the recent history of systematic risk is a significant
indicator of the present level of asymmetry risk, it does not replace or subsume the effect
of fundamental and macroeconomic factors. The same is true for the lag of asymmetry risk
itself. While our findings suggest a significant trend component in this measure, the firm
characteristics are still statistically and economically meaningful predictors of the risk of
joint negative return clusters between a REIT and the stock market.
In summary, our results suggest that investors are able to form expectations about the
risk of a REIT to exhibit negative return clusters with the market, and thus the benefits
of including a given stock in a portfolio, by assessing the firm’s leverage, size as well as its
12 Our findings are consistent across the policy rate (federal funds rate) and the market-determined interest rate
(10-year Treasury rate).
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investment growth and past performance. During recession periods, the most important
predictors of a firm’s likelihood to register joint return declines with the market are its
leverage and investment growth metrics. Our findings are generally robust to a longer-term
prediction horizon as well (see Column (2) in Appendix A.1).
7 Robustness tests
In our main analysis, we have winsorised firm characteristics and dependence measures to
mitigate any undue influence of outliers. However, winsorising may lead us to underesti-
mate the true magnitude of the effects. For robustness, we have conducted two additional
tests: (i) We have run our main regression analysis with only the firm characteristic vari-
ables winsorised but not the dependence measures; (ii) We have run our regression analysis
with no variables winsorised at all. The results are qualitatively identical.
However, the coefficient estimates increase in magnitude in the two additional tests (see
example for leverage in Table 6). Overall, these additional findings suggest that our main
results are conservative and indicate the lower bound on the leverage effect.
[Insert Table 6 about here.]
We have estimated the regressions of the CAPM beta and the Adjusted J statistic on
the basis of the implicit assumption that they are independent. However, in order to
account for the possibility of cross-equation correlation of residuals, we reproduce our
main regression results for the full study period using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
(SUR, Zellner (1962, 1963); Zellner and Huang (1962)). The results from this robustness
test in Table 7 show that our findings are identical. That is because the model for the
CAPM beta is nested in the model for the Adjusted J statistic. The SUR framework also
allows for joint hypothesis tests. We exploit this feature to test a joint hypothesis about the
influence of leverage on both dependence measures. We reject the hypothesis (χ2 = 5.50,
p-value=0.064) that leverage is jointly zero in both models, confirming the influence of
leverage on dependence patterns that we have documented in the single-equation models.
[Insert Table 7 about here.]
Our suggested intuition behind the asymmetric effect of leverage on dependence patterns
is based on managerial incentives to increase exposure to hidden tail risks, possibly via
leverage (Alcock, Glascock, and Steiner, 2013; Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch,
2007), and report the compensation as alpha (Diamond and Rajan, 2009). Our argument
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then implies that this strategy is unsuccessful and that leverage mainly filters through to
asymmetric and linear dependence, not alpha. In order to examine this point empirically,
we exploit the following convenient feature of our empirical set-up. The estimation of the
CAPM beta allows us to obtain a value for alpha as a measure of performance that is
unrelated to the firm returns generated as compensation for the linear dependence of the
firm on the variation in the return on the market. We collect a firm-quarter panel of alpha
estimates analogous to the way in which we compile the beta estimates. We then regress
these alpha estimates on leverage and the firm characteristics of interest in our study.
The results shown in Table 8 suggest that leverage is indeed unrelated to alpha, implying
that strategies of using leverage to increase tail risk exposure are unable to improve alpha.
This finding lends additional support to our earlier result that leverage primarily increases
asymmetric and in the longer run also linear dependence.
[Insert Table 8 about here.]
Mosteller (1977) argues that conventional linear regression techniques solely describe the
conditional mean of a response variable and as such often provide an incomplete picture.
In order to provide a more comprehensive picture of the relationship between firm char-
acteristics and dependence patterns, we estimate a quantile regression of the conditional
median of the dependence measures (Bassett and Koenker, 1978; Koenker, 2005; Koenker
and Bassett, 1978). The results shown in Table 9 suggest that our main finding of the effect
of leverage on asymmetric dependence is robust when estimating the conditional median
of the Adjusted J statistic instead of its conditional mean. Furthermore, the results reveal
a contemporaneous effect of leverage on linear dependence as measured by the conditional
median of the CAPM beta as well. Our finding suggests that the weaker relationship be-
tween leverage and the conditional mean of the CAPM beta may be driven by the effect
of outliers, as the mean is more sensitive to outliers than the median of a distribution.
This observation further underpins our argument that our main findings are conservative
and represent a lower bound on the effect of leverage on dependence patterns.
[Insert Table 9 about here.]
Our analysis mainly considers characteristics pertaining to the general and financial struc-
ture of the firm. However, REITs are also distinguished along the property sector that they
focus on. The nature of the underlying assets and associated lease contracts that is spe-
cific to any given property sector may also influence dependence patterns. Therefore, we
have recovered the coefficients on the sector fixed-effects we include in our empirical spec-
ifications. Table 10 shows that these are largely insignificant. The only exceptions are
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multi-family housing and specialty properties, which have slightly lower levels of linear
dependence. We conclude from this robustness test that the influence of firm characteris-
tics is statistically and economically more important for determining dependence patterns
than the nature of the underlying assets. This observation implies that investors and man-
agers in all REIT sectors may benefit from understanding the role of firm characteristics
and especially leverage in driving the dependence profile of their firms.
[Insert Table 10 about here.]
For robustness, we have also considered measures of return synchronicity obtained as the
R2 coefficients of quarterly single-index CAPM regressions of the firm returns relative to
the S&P500 index (Chan and Chan, 2014; Cotter, Gabriel, and Roll, 2015; Han, Hwang,
and Cho, 2015; Roll, 1988). Table 11 shows the results.
[Insert Table 11 about here.]
With regards to our central hypothesis on leverage, the results suggest that firms with
higher levels of leverage have lower return synchronicity with the S&P500 index in the
sense that the variation in the returns on that stock market index has lower explanatory
power for the returns on the firm. This robustness test suggests that, for a given level
of total risk, leverage shifts a portion of that total risk away from the linear, symmetric
exposure to variation in the stock market, and towards higher-order components of risk
that are not captured in standard linear measures. Therefore, this finding is consistent with
our main result that leverage primarily increases asymmetry risks in REIT firm returns.
Lastly, the principles of corporate finance state that leverage magnifies both positive and
negative returns on the firm’s equity. These principles imply that when negative returns are
realised, as in a recession, then we should anticipate a lower Adjusted J statistic. It follows
that if the influence of leverage is symmetrical, then we would anticipate a higher positive
Adjusted J statistic in times of economic expansion. However, our argument implies an
asymmetric influence of leverage, affecting the downside disproportionately more than the
upside. In order to illustrate the asymmetric effect of leverage further, we estimate positive
and negative return clusters separately by focusing on positive and negative observations
of the Adjusted J statistic as distinct from one another. As expected, we only find that
leverage exacerbates the likelihood of joint negative returns. We do not find evidence that
leverage promotes the occurrence of joint positive returns on the upside, supporting our
argument that leverage has a disproportionate effect on the downside.
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[Insert Table 12 about here.]
8 Conclusion
The literature suggests that the fundamental economic drivers behind firm-level systematic
risk as well as the risk of joint negative returns between a REIT and the stock market
are insufficiently understood. In particular, the role of leverage in determining dependence
patterns is under-researched. Understanding this link is important in order to identify
the channels through which leverage affects risk and thus returns on REIT stocks. To
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to explore the fundamental REIT firm
characteristics that determine these aspects of dependence patterns in REIT returns.
We find that linear dependence and an increasing likelihood of return clustering between
REITs and stocks are distinct aspects of return patterns. We find strong relationships
between firm fundamentals and systematic risk as well as asymmetric risk that are unex-
plained by macroeconomic events, monetary policy regimes or trends in the risk measures
themselves. While the influence of firm characteristics is somewhat reduced during reces-
sionary periods, they remain significant. However, average systematic risk and asymmetric
risk are related to firm characteristics in different ways.
Specifically, stocks with low systematic risk are typically small, with low short-term mo-
mentum, low turnover, high growth opportunities and strong long-term momentum. In or-
der to reduce risk of negative returns clusters, robust portfolios should underweight stocks
with strong short-term momentum. On the other hand, investment growth is associated
with a lower likelihood of joint negative return clusters. Lastly, we find some evidence that
leverage increases linear dependence of REIT returns on stocks in the longer run, but has
an asymmetric impact and significantly exacerbates clustering of poor returns in the short
and longer term. This last finding adds to the evidence on the role of leverage in REIT
performance by highlighting the asymmetric nature of leverage on risk.
The practical implications of understanding the drivers of dependence patterns are pro-
found. Our results help guide managers in modulating the investment risk of their firm, for
instance by choosing the appropriate level of leverage for their firm. On the other hand,
our findings also provide guidance for investors. Our results imply that investors are able
to draw valid inferences about the future systematic and asymmetric risk profile of a REIT
from observable firm characteristics. Overall, our findings assist managers and investors
alike in assessing and managing the role of REIT stocks in mixed-asset portfolios.
24
We see two avenues for future research on this topic. The first relates to how investors can
modify traditional diversification strategies to account for asymmetry risks as measured
by the Adjusted J statistic, above and beyond the linear dependence captured in the fa-
miliar CAPM beta. Research efforts in stocks already present promising results. Hatherley
and Alcock (2007) and Alcock and Hatherley (2009) develop a general methodology that
can be used to determine the robustness of mean-variance-based portfolio theory to non-
normal assumptions, focusing particularly on the effects of the assumption of asymmetric
dependence. They demonstrate that for both portfolios of indices and for individual stocks,
portfolio performance substantially improves by correcting for asymmetric dependence. At
this stage, however, little definitive can be said about the effects of asymmetric dependence
on the optimal real estate portfolio. Second, there is the question of pricing asymmetry
risks. Again, initial results for general stocks (Alcock and Hatherley, 2016) suggest a signif-
icant price premium for stocks with low risk of disproportionate negative return clusters,
and a significant price discount for stocks with high risk of disproportionate negative re-
turn clusters. Yet, research has yet to establish the price of asymmetric dependence in real
estate and listed real estate securities. While these questions are beyond the scope of this
study, they may provide fruitful ground for future research.
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Scatter plots for simulated returns on a broad stock market index (X1) and a security (X2)
Fig. 1. The figure shows scatter plots of simulated data on the market (X1) and a security (X2) under two
different assumptions about dependence patterns between the return series. The panel on the left shows an evenly
spread, symmetrical distribution of returns whose dependence structure is fully captured by the familiar CAPM
beta that measures the slope of a straight line through the scatter plot. The panel on the right shows an asymmetric
distribution of returns with a disproportionate clustering of poor returns that leaves the slope of a straight line
through the scatter plot largely unaffected.
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Fig. 2. The figure shows the evolution of the quarterly number of firms with complete observations in our sample
over the study period 1993-2013.
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Evolution of mean firm-quarter dependence measures
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Fig. 3. The figure shows the evolution of quarterly mean firm-level single-factor beta estimates with respect to the
S&P500 (Panel (a)) and the Adjusted J statistic (Panel (b)) over the period 1993 to 2013. Single-factor betas are
obtained from quarterly firm-by-firm regressions of daily total returns on the S&P500 index. Quarterly Adjusted J
statistics are obtained from daily data on the respective REITs and the S&P500 index. The bars indicate a 95%
confidence interval around the mean estimate.
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Evolution of mean firm-quarter dependence measures relative to NBER recession dates
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Fig. 4. The figure shows the evolution of quarterly mean firm-level single-factor beta estimates with respect to the
S&P500 and the Adjusted J statistic over the period 1993 to 2013. Single-factor betas are obtained from quarterly
firm-by-firm regressions of daily total returns on the S&P500 index. Quarterly Adjusted J statistics are obtained
from daily data on the respective REITs and the S&P500 index. The grey shaded areas indicate NBER recession
dates.
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Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD P5 P25 Median P75 P95 Unit root
Single-factor beta 0.589 0.614 -0.183 0.157 0.423 1.001 1.696 -48.494***
Adjusted J statistic -0.184 0.886 -1.715 -0.413 -0.049 0.045 1.010 -30.698***
Market leverage 0.440 0.184 0.045 0.335 0.435 0.555 0.750 -11.153***
Market-to-book ratio 1.204 0.336 0.758 1.004 1.151 1.337 1.860 -5.739***
Log of firm size 12.844 1.835 9.071 11.904 13.165 14.186 15.261 3.697
6-month return 0.071 0.218 -0.269 -0.038 0.065 0.171 0.429 -46.578***
36-month return 0.488 0.716 -0.558 0.039 0.449 0.824 1.721 -7.714***
Turnover ratio 0.295 0.297 0.021 0.102 0.206 0.382 0.851 -33.927***
RE investment growth 0.185 0.518 -0.160 -0.024 0.035 0.187 1.045 -72.262***
Return on average equity 0.072 0.151 -0.090 0.031 0.071 0.109 0.241 -61.393***
Federal funds rate (%) 3.167 2.252 0.090 1.000 3.460 5.280 6.020 26.459
NBER recession periods 0.105 0.306 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 -44.872***
Table 1
The table presents the descriptive statistics on the sample firms. Single-factor betas are obtained from quarterly
firm-by-firm regressions of daily total returns on the S&P500 index. Quarterly Adjusted J statistics are obtained
from daily data on the respective REITs and the S&P500 index. Market leverage is measured as Total Debt divided
by the Market Value of Assets (Total Assets minus Book Equity + Market value of Equity). Firm size is the natural
logarithm of the Market Capitalisation. Market-to-book ratio is the Market Value of Assets divided by the book
value of Total Assets. 6-month return is the 6-month cumulative total return. 36-month return is the 36-month
cumulative total return. Turnover ratio is quarterly Trading volume divided by Common Shares Outstanding. Real
estate (RE) investment growth measures the rate of investment. Return on average equity measures profitability.
All firm-level data and return data on the firms, the S&P500 and the Russell 2000 is obtained form SNL Financial.
Data on the federal funds rate is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis’s Economic Database and
business cycle indicators are from NBER. The study period is 1993 to 2013. The total number of observations in
the final sample is 3,828. The final column shows the inverse normal z-statistic from a Fisher-type (Augmented
Dickey-Fuller) test for unit roots in unbalanced panel data proposed in Choi (2001). The null hypothesis is that
no panel (firm) has a unit root in the variable concerned. We reject the null hypothesis for all but one of the firm
characteristics we are interested in (firm size). Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Unconditional quintile analysis for covariates of dependence measures
Panel (a): CAPM Beta 1 2 3 4 5 Difference (t-statistic)
Market leverage 0.462 0.417 0.422 0.421 0.477 0.015 (1.43)
Log of firm size 11.647 12.982 13.322 13.393 12.895 1.248*** (13.14)
Market to book ratio 1.186 1.219 1.245 1.226 1.145 -0.0413* (-2.24)
6-month return 0.077 0.074 0.073 0.062 0.071 -0.005 (-0.40)
36-month return 0.482 0.492 0.521 0.526 0.419 -0.0624 (-1.52)
Turnover ratio 0.198 0.289 0.312 0.333 0.342 0.144*** (9.37)
RE investment growth 0.209 0.171 0.176 0.171 0.196 -0.012 (-0.43)
ROAE 0.064 0.071 0.081 0.076 0.070 0.006 (0.78)
Panel (b): Adjusted J statistic 1 2 3 4 5 Difference (t-statistic)
Market leverage 0.470 0.437 0.436 0.430 0.425 -0.045*** (-4.60)
Log of firm size 12.408 12.879 13.008 12.971 12.960 0.552*** (5.78)
Market to book ratio 1.178 1.201 1.209 1.222 1.211 0.033 (1.91)
6-month return 0.080 0.069 0.076 0.069 0.062 -0.018 (-1.55)
36-month return 0.439 0.471 0.525 0.510 0.495 0.056 (1.50)
Turnover ratio 0.266 0.297 0.315 0.296 0.301 0.0349* (2.38)
RE investment growth 0.191 0.176 0.194 0.173 0.189 -0.003 (-0.10)
ROAE 0.072 0.074 0.074 0.070 0.072 -0.001 (-0.10)
Table 3
The table presents the results from the unconditional quintile analysis of the covariates of the dependence measures.
Quintiles are formed by sorting firms into quarterly groups according to the value of their respective dependence
measures. In Panel (a), single-factor betas are obtained from quarterly firm-by-firm regressions of daily total returns
on the S&P500 index. In Panel (b), quarterly Adjusted J statistics are obtained from daily data on the respective
REITs and the S&P500 index. Market leverage is measured as Total Debt divided by the Market Value of Assets
(Total Assets minus Book Equity + Market value of Equity). Firm size is the natural logarithm of the Market
Capitalisation. Market-to-book ratio is the Market Value of Assets divided by the book value of Total Assets. 6-
month return is the 6-month cumulative total return. 36-month return is the 36-month cumulative total return.
Turnover ratio is quarterly Trading volume divided by Common Shares Outstanding. Real estate investment growth
measures the rate of investment. Return on average equity measures profitability. L.Beta is the first lag of the single-
factor beta. All firm-level data and return data on the firms and the S&P500 is obtained form SNL Financial. Data
on the federal funds rate is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis’s Economic Database and business
cycle indicators are from NBER. Difference indicates the difference in the mean characteristic values across the 1st
and 5th quintiles of the dependence measures. The corresponding t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance
is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Regression results for single-factor beta with respect to S&P 500 index
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Full period Recession Non-recession
Market leverage 0.043 0.174 0.046
(0.04) (0.12) (0.04)
Log of firm size 0.043*** 0.059*** 0.043***
0.00 (0.01) 0.00
Market to book ratio -0.066*** -0.168** -0.061***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02)
6-month return 0.063* 0.122 0.069*
(0.03) (0.08) (0.04)
36-month return -0.024** -0.013 -0.025**
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Turnover ratio 0.345*** 0.378*** 0.270***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
RE investment growth 0.009 -0.061 0.01
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
ROAE -0.005 0.075 -0.029
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04)
Federal funds rate (%) -0.094*** -0.125*** -0.113***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
NBER business cycle indicator 0.231*** n/a n/a
(0.08) n/a n/a
L.beta 0.350*** 0.513*** 0.333***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
Constant 0.138 0.068 0.223**
(0.10) (0.25) (0.11)
Observations 3,828 401 3,427
R-squared 0.709 0.870 0.665
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes
Quarter effects Yes Yes Yes
Table 4
The table presents the regression results for the firm-quarter observations of the single-factor beta with respect to
the S&P500. The single-factor beta is obtained from quarterly firm-by-firm regressions of daily total returns on
the S&P500 index. The lag of beta is included as a control variable. Market leverage is measured as Total Debt
divided by the Market Value of Assets (Total Assets minus Book Equity + Market value of Equity). Firm size is
the natural logarithm of the Market Capitalisation. Market-to-book ratio is the Market Value of Assets divided by
the book value of Total Assets. 6-month return is the 6-month cumulative total return. 36-month return is the 36-
month cumulative total return. Turnover ratio is quarterly Trading volume divided by Common Shares Outstanding.
Real estate investment growth measures the rate of investment. Return on average equity measures profitability.
L.Beta is the first lag of the single-factor beta. All firm-level data and return data on the firms and the S&P500
is obtained form SNL Financial. Data on the federal funds rate is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St
Louis’s Economic Database and business cycle indicators are from NBER. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are
robust to the estimated dependent variable bias, using the weighting procedure proposed in Hornstein and Greene
(2012). Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Regression results for Adjusted J statistic with respect to S&P 500 index
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Full period Recession Non-recession
Market leverage -0.134** -0.590*** -0.080
(0.07) (0.22) (0.07)
Log of firm size 0.027*** -0.014 0.028***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Market to book ratio -0.058 0.110 -0.069*
(0.04) (0.13) (0.04)
6-month return -0.227*** -0.054 -0.262***
(0.06) (0.15) (0.06)
36-month return 0.037** 0.052 0.036*
(0.02) (0.08) (0.02)
Turnover ratio -0.031 0.158 -0.054
(0.06) (0.11) (0.07)
RE investment growth 0.042** 0.208** 0.033*
(0.02) (0.08) (0.02)
ROAE 0.002 0.131 -0.042
(0.06) (0.14) (0.07)
Federal funds rate (%) 0.002 0.067* 0.000
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
NBER business cycle indicator 0.624*** n/a n/a
(0.13) n/a n/a
L.beta 0.046* 0.067 0.046
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03)
L.jstat 0.636*** 0.545*** 0.638***
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
Constant -0.479*** 0.175 -0.433**
(0.17) (0.45) (0.19)
Observations 3,828 401 3,427
R-squared 0.584 0.371 0.598
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes
Quarter effects Yes Yes Yes
Table 5
The table presents the regression results for the firm-quarter observations of the Adjusted J statistic with respect
to the S&P500. The lags of the Adjusted J statistic and the single-factor beta are included as a control variable.
Market leverage is measured as Total Debt divided by the Market Value of Assets (Total Assets minus Book Equity
+ Market value of Equity). Firm size is the natural logarithm of the Market Capitalisation. Market-to-book ratio
is the Market Value of Assets divided by the book value of Total Assets. 6-month return is the 6-month cumulative
total return. 36-month return is the 36-month cumulative total return. Turnover ratio is quarterly Trading volume
divided by Common Shares Outstanding. Real estate investment growth measures the rate of investment. Return on
average equity measures profitability. L.Beta is the first lag of the single-factor beta. All firm-level data and return
data on the firms and the S&P500 is obtained form SNL Financial. Data on the federal funds rate is obtained from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis’s Economic Database and business cycle indicators are from NBER. Standard
errors, shown in parentheses, are robust to the estimated dependent variable bias, using the weighting procedure
proposed in Hornstein and Greene (2012). Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Comparison of regression coefficients for market leverage across models with varying degrees of
winsorising the sample data
Effect of leverage CAPM beta Adjusted J statistic
Model Full period Recession Non-recession Full period Recession Non-recession
Baseline 0.043 0.174 0.046 -0.134 -0.590 -0.080
Test (i) 0.051 0.210 0.051 -0.149 -0.599 -0.084
Test (ii) 0.055 0.233 0.052 -0.163 -0.600 -0.096
Table 6
The table summarises the regression coefficients on market leverage from the models in Tables 4 and 5. Test (i)
shows the coefficients obtained when only firm characteristic variables are winsorised. Test (ii) shows the coefficients
obtained when no variables are winsorised. Significance levels remain unchanged from the main results in Tables 4
and 5.
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Regression results for Alpha with respect to S&P 500 index
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Full period Recession Non-recession
Market leverage 0.018 -0.039 0.033
(0.03) (0.13) (0.02)
Log of firm size -0.017*** 0.01 -0.020***
0.00 (0.01) 0.00
Market to book ratio -0.027* -0.036 -0.022
(0.01) (0.08) (0.01)
6-month return -0.070*** 0.217** -0.119***
(0.03) (0.10) (0.03)
36-month return 0.022*** -0.025 0.026***
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
Turnover ratio -0.03 -0.056 -0.012
(0.02) (0.06) (0.03)
RE investment growth -0.015** -0.017 -0.016**
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
ROAE 0.031 0.061 0.021
(0.02) (0.08) (0.03)
Federal funds rate (%) 0.005 -0.006 0.000
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
NBER business cycle indicator -0.042 n/a n/a
(0.06) n/a n/a
L.alpha 4.094** 5.889 2.661
(1.86) (5.62) (1.99)
Constant 0.309*** 0.115 0.389***
-0.06 -0.27 -0.07
Observations 3,828 401 3,427
R-squared 0.191 0.13 0.221
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes
Quarter effects Yes Yes Yes
Table 8
The table presents the regression results for the firm-quarter observations of the alpha coefficient obtained from
the CAPM regressions with respect to the S&P500. The lag of the alpha estimate is included as a control variable.
Market leverage is measured as Total Debt divided by the Market Value of Assets (Total Assets minus Book Equity
+ Market value of Equity). Firm size is the natural logarithm of the Market Capitalisation. Market-to-book ratio
is the Market Value of Assets divided by the book value of Total Assets. 6-month return is the 6-month cumulative
total return. 36-month return is the 36-month cumulative total return. Turnover ratio is quarterly Trading volume
divided by Common Shares Outstanding. Real estate investment growth measures the rate of investment. Return on
average equity measures profitability. L.Beta is the first lag of the single-factor beta. All firm-level data and return
data on the firms and the S&P500 is obtained form SNL Financial. Data on the federal funds rate is obtained from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis’s Economic Database and business cycle indicators are from NBER. Standard
errors, shown in parentheses, are robust to the estimated dependent variable bias, using the weighting procedure
proposed in Hornstein and Greene (2012). Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Quantile regression results for CAPM beta and Adjusted J statistic with respect to S&P 500
index, full study period 1993-2013
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Beta Adjusted J statistic
Market leverage 0.037* -0.073**
(0.02) (0.03)
Log of firm size 0.035*** 0.000
0.00 0.00
Market to book ratio -0.060*** 0.009
(0.01) (0.01)
6-month return 0.106*** -0.033
(0.02) (0.03)
36-month return -0.004 0.014
(0.01) (0.01)
Turnover ratio 0.191*** 0.015
(0.02) (0.02)
RE investment growth -0.005 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
ROAE 0.017 0.001
(0.02) (0.02)
Federal funds rate (%) -0.076*** -0.035
(0.01) (0.03)
NBER business cycle indicator 0.828*** -0.064
(0.04) (0.07)
L.beta 0.415*** 0.016
(0.01) (0.01)
L.jstat n/a 0.596***
n/a (0.01)
Constant -0.026 0.021
(0.05) (0.09)
Observations 3,828 3,828
Sector effects Yes Yes
Quarter effects Yes Yes
Table 9
The table presents the regression results for the firm-quarter observations of the CAPM beta and Adjusted J statistic
with respect to the S&P500 over the full study period using quantile (median) regression. The lags of the CAPM
beta and Adjusted J statistic estimates are included as a control variable. Market leverage is measured as Total
Debt divided by the Market Value of Assets (Total Assets minus Book Equity + Market value of Equity). Firm
size is the natural logarithm of the Market Capitalisation. Market-to-book ratio is the Market Value of Assets
divided by the book value of Total Assets. 6-month return is the 6-month cumulative total return. 36-month return
is the 36-month cumulative total return. Turnover ratio is quarterly Trading volume divided by Common Shares
Outstanding. Real estate investment growth measures the rate of investment. Return on average equity measures
profitability. L.Beta is the first lag of the single-factor beta. All firm-level data and return data on the firms and
the S&P500 is obtained form SNL Financial. Data on the federal funds rate is obtained from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St Louis’s Economic Database and business cycle indicators are from NBER. Standard errors, shown in
parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Sector fixed effects recovered from main regression analysis, full study period 1993-2013
Full period CAPM beta Adjusted J statistic
No. Sector Coefficient (Standard error) Coefficient (Standard error)
1 Casino Reference n/a Reference n/a
2 Diversified -0.048 (0.04) -0.030 (0.06)
3 Health Care -0.029 (0.04) 0.049 (0.07)
4 Hotel 0.056 (0.04) 0.045 (0.07)
5 Industrial 0.004 (0.04) 0.054 (0.07)
6 Multi-Family -0.086** (0.04) 0.072 (0.06)
7 Office -0.035 (0.04) 0.003 (0.06)
8 Other Retail 0.023 (0.04) 0.090 (0.07)
9 Regional Mall 0.046 (0.04) 0.087 (0.07)
10 Self-Storage -0.025 (0.06) 0.037 (0.11)
11 Shopping Center 0.004 (0.04) 0.059 (0.06)
12 Specialty -0.112*** (0.04) 0.038 (0.07)
Table 10
The table presents the regression coefficients associated with the sector fixed effects that were included for robustness
in the main regression results for the CAPM beta and Adjusted J statistic with respect to the S&P500 over the full
study period form Tables 4 and 5. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are robust to the estimated dependent
variable bias, using the weighting procedure proposed in Hornstein and Greene (2012). Significance is indicated as
follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Regression results for R2 measure of synchronicity with respect to S&P 500 index
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Full period Recession Non-recession
Market leverage -0.034*** -0.030 -0.030***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
Log of firm size 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.017***
0.00 0.00 0.00
Market to book ratio -0.017*** -0.040* -0.016***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
6-month return 0.038*** 0.082*** 0.030***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
36-month return -0.002 0.005 -0.002
0.00 (0.01) 0.00
Turnover ratio 0.080*** 0.115*** 0.060***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
RE investment growth -0.002 -0.012 -0.002
0.00 (0.01) 0.00
ROAE 0.022** 0.031 0.021**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Federal funds rate (%) -0.011*** -0.032*** -0.015***
0.00 (0.01) 0.00
NBER business cycle indicator 0.090*** n/a n/a
(0.02) n/a n/a
L.R Squared 0.426*** 0.401*** 0.418***
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02)
Constant -0.057** -0.012 -0.037
(0.02) (0.08) (0.02)
Observations 3,825 401 3,424
R-squared 0.826 0.869 0.812
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes
Quarter effects Yes Yes Yes
Table 11
The table presents the regression results for the firm-quarter observations of the R2 measure of synchronicity
obtained from the CAPM regressions with respect to the S&P500. The lag of the R2 estimate is included as a
control variable. Market leverage is measured as Total Debt divided by the Market Value of Assets (Total Assets
minus Book Equity + Market value of Equity). Firm size is the natural logarithm of the Market Capitalisation.
Market-to-book ratio is the Market Value of Assets divided by the book value of Total Assets. 6-month return is
the 6-month cumulative total return. 36-month return is the 36-month cumulative total return. Turnover ratio is
quarterly Trading volume divided by Common Shares Outstanding. Real estate investment growth measures the
rate of investment. Return on average equity measures profitability. L.Beta is the first lag of the single-factor beta.
All firm-level data and return data on the firms and the S&P500 is obtained form SNL Financial. Data on the
federal funds rate is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis’s Economic Database and business cycle
indicators are from NBER. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are robust to the estimated dependent variable
bias, using the weighting procedure proposed in Hornstein and Greene (2012). Significance is indicated as follows:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Regression results for negative and positive Adjusted J statistic with respect to S&P 500 index
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Negative J-stat Positive J-stat
Market leverage -0.153* -0.143
(0.08) (0.11)
Log of firm size 0.027*** 0.008
(0.01) (0.01)
Market to book ratio -0.060 -0.047
(0.05) (0.06)
6-month return -0.285*** -0.047
(0.07) (0.10)
36-month return 0.032 0.024
(0.02) (0.03)
Turnover ratio -0.054 0.02
(0.08) (0.08)
RE investment growth 0.03 0.065**
(0.02) (0.03)
ROAE 0.025 0.001
(0.08) (0.10)
Federal funds rate (%) -0.161** -0.010
(0.08) (0.10)
NBER business cycle indicator -0.848*** 0.108
(0.27) (0.35)
L.beta 0.077** 0.003
(0.03) (0.04)
L.jstat 0.590*** 0.468***
(0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.197 -0.177
(0.28) (0.29)
Observations 2,441 1,387
R-squared 0.447 0.551
Sector effects Yes Yes
Quarter effects Yes Yes
Table 12
The table presents the regression results for the firm-quarter observations of the positive and negative Adjusted
J statistics, with respect to the S&P500, estimated separately. The lags of the Adjusted J statistic estimates are
included as a control variable. Market leverage is measured as Total Debt divided by the Market Value of Assets
(Total Assets minus Book Equity + Market value of Equity). Firm size is the natural logarithm of the Market
Capitalisation. Market-to-book ratio is the Market Value of Assets divided by the book value of Total Assets. 6-
month return is the 6-month cumulative total return. 36-month return is the 36-month cumulative total return.
Turnover ratio is quarterly Trading volume divided by Common Shares Outstanding. Real estate investment growth
measures the rate of investment. Return on average equity measures profitability. L.Beta is the first lag of the single-
factor beta. All firm-level data and return data on the firms and the S&P500 is obtained form SNL Financial. Data
on the federal funds rate is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis’s Economic Database and business
cycle indicators are from NBER. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are robust to the estimated dependent
variable bias, using the weighting procedure proposed in Hornstein and Greene (2012). Significance is indicated as
follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendices
A Longer term regressions
Regression results for six-months and one-year ahead beta and Adjusted J statistic with respect to
S&P 500 index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 6 months Beta 6 months J statistic 1 year Beta 1 year J statistic
Market leverage 0.072* -0.220*** 0.062 -0.248***
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09)
Log of firm size 0.053*** 0.046*** 0.063*** 0.066***
0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Market to book ratio -0.099*** -0.083* -0.112*** -0.073
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
6-month return 0.039 -0.348*** 0.081** 0.054
(0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08)
36-month return -0.017 0.061*** -0.011 0.061**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Turnover ratio 0.358*** 0.032 0.248*** -0.037
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08)
RE investment growth 0.012 0.008 -0.011 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
ROAE 0.028 0.011 0.052 0.104
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08)
Federal funds rate (%) -0.017 -0.173*** -0.061*** -0.039
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
NBER business cycle indicator 0.271*** 0.928*** -0.228*** 0.400**
(0.08) (0.16) (0.08) (0.17)
L.beta 0.317*** -0.02 0.301*** 0.016
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
L.jstat n/a 0.385*** n/a 0.02
n/a (0.02) n/a (0.02)
Constant -0.318*** -0.109 -0.252** -0.940***
(0.10) (0.21) (0.11) (0.23)
Observations 3,735 3,723 3,529 3,520
R-squared 0.704 0.419 0.711 0.327
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A.1
The table presents the regression results for the firm-quarter observations of the 6-months and one-year ahead
single-factor beta with respect to the S&P500 (Column (1)) and the Adjusted J statistic (Column (2)). Variables
are defined as in the main analysis. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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